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The Future of the European Union
by Tyson Smith1

A

I. Introduction

s President Hans Pottering said in his inaugural speech as
President of the European Parliament, “Europe is a complex
continent. This faces all of us with huge challenges. The
European Union (EU) can no longer operate using the inadequate
instruments of current treaty law.”2 Arguably, efficiency, as in many
large organizations, needs to be addressed; complex treaty amendments could be simplified and various EU institutions could be reworked. Yet as the EU contemplates its future as a supranational
organization, care must be taken to ensure that it does not overstep
its bounds as it engages in this process. Founded in the wake of World
War II, the original EU was established to bring peace to a war-torn
continent and to promote the shared goal of prosperity.3 As the EU
facilitates these foundational principles of peace and prosperity, it
must be careful not to stifle two other integral underpinnings of the
European Union, namely democracy and subsidiarity. Yet as it has
grown in size and scope, the EU has become an increasingly cen1
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tralized government with extensive legislative powers. The Treaty
of Lisbon, evolved from the proposed Constitution for Europe and
signed by EU leaders on December 13, 2007, will take the EU in a
direction even further removed from its original role as a facilitator
of peace and prosperity. Institutional changes included in the Treaty
of Lisbon and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights show how subsidiarity is reduced and that the EU is overstepping its bounds.
The future of the EU should be shaped by the role it was created to play within Europe. It should continue to facilitate peace and
prosperity while protecting democracy and subsidiarity. Yet, while
the European Union was established to accomplish these ends, the
Treaty of Lisbon moves the EU further from these founding principles by creating a more powerful, more centralized government. The
initiators of this Treaty believe it will enhance democracy, but the
Treaty of Lisbon will further erode the democratic system of the EU
by reducing the sovereignty and authority of each nation through the
institutional reforms and the Charter of Fundamental Rights which
it enacts.

II. Founding Values—Working Towards Common Goals
A. Peace and Prosperity
As a supranational organization, the European Union was
founded on certain fundamental principles. As the history of the EU
illustrates, peace is the foundation on which the European Union is
built. After centuries of conflict, the end of World War II brought
together courageous and revolutionary leaders such as Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi and Winston Churchill,
who envisioned Europe becoming a place united by peace. In 1950,
French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman presented a plan for even
deeper cooperation than the peace treaty that ended the war, and
by 1951, six countries—Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands—had come together
to create the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), determined to use common values and resources to establish peace. These
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six countries all signed a treaty to run their heavy industries—coal
and steel—under a common management. In this way, none of these
countries could make weapons of war to turn against the other, as
in the past.4 Thus, the first priority of this unique coalition of countries was to facilitate peace. Even today, more than fifty years after
the European Economic Community (EEC) was founded, European
Parliament President Hans Pottering said, speaking of the EU: “The
greatest success has been overcoming the division of Europe. Our
shared values have prevailed.”5 As a result, by allowing common
values and resources to be shared, the European Union has been, and
continues to be, a tremendous facilitator of peace.
History of the EU also demonstrates its role as a facilitator of
prosperity. Cooperation was achieved between these original six
countries as they worked together towards common goals in shared
institutions, and in 1957 the Treaty of Rome was put into effect. This
Treaty broadened the economic scope of the cooperation and established the EEC. The name of this treaty bespeaks the purpose of the
EEC: the common goal of economic prosperity. The common institutional platform put in to place allowed countries to begin working together towards greater economic prosperity. The success of the EEC
prompted other European countries to join the EEC. Thus, during
this first enlargement, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland
joined the original six. The EU continued to enlarge and develop,
and by 1986, Greece, Spain, and Portugal had joined. The economic
structure continued to develop, and although it is debatable whether
the current scope of the economic union is appropriate, the European
Community did provide a valuable facilitating role as it furthered
the founding values of peace and prosperity throughout Europe.
These principles, peace and prosperity, form the foundation of
what the European Union is trying to accomplish. This being said,
the EU must use caution to not overextend its powers in facilitat4
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ing these objectives. Otherwise, it runs the risk of undermining two
other founding principles: democracy and subsidiarity.
B. Democracy and Subsidiarity
The EU should accomplish its role as a facilitator of peace and
prosperity without stifling well-established principles of democracy
and subsidiarity. It can readily be seen that democracy is an espoused
virtue of the EU. For example, while member states of the EU have
obvious differences in their government institutions, each nation
state in the EU must demonstrate that they function as a democracy
before they can become a member of the EU.6 If the EU requires its
members to be run by democratic governments, it must also follow
the same principle.
Working hand-in-hand with the principle of democracy is what
the EU refers to as subsidiarity. Subsidiarity means that “the Community [i.e. the European Union] shall take action . . . only if and in
so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently
achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the
scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the
Community.”7 Even as the European Community transformed itself
from an economic to a political entity, the Treaty on European Union
of 1992, which forms the “European Union,” declares that the European Union is “RESOLVED to continue the process of creating an
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions
are taken as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance with the
principle of subsidiarity.”8 As the EU decides what is “appropriate”
for action on the European level, it must remember to take decisions
6
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as close to the people as possible. Subsidiarity is thus an important
concept in the EU, and it is a characteristic of any democratic nation.
Rhetoric extolling the need for subsidiarity within the European
Union is heard in speeches and in official literature of the Union. For
example, in the document “Communication from the Commission to
the European Council” issued in October 2006, we read that “[t]he
EU must respect the principle of subsidiarity, acting at the European
level only when appropriate.”9 However, the course that the Treaty
of Lisbon sets for the EU will reduce subsidiarity rather than encourage it.

III. Shifting Away From Democracy and Subsidiarity
As the EU charts its future as a facilitator of peace and prosperity, it should be promoting these two vital, governing principles
of democracy and subsidiarity. What’s more, as the EU has grown
both institutionally and through enlargement, it must be particularly
vigilant in promoting subsidiarity. Support for the Treaty of Lisbon
claims that promotion of democracy is one of the purposes of the
Treaty, which states the desire “to complete the process started by
the Treaty of Amsterdam and by the Treaty of Nice with a view to
enhancing the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the Union.”10
Yet the Treaty of Lisbon will create institutional changes in the name
of democracy that push the Union even further from subsidiarity and
open up more doors to do so even further in the future.
A. Fundamental Changes
For example, the Treaty provides for moving from one Commissioner per country (twenty-seven) to only eighteen commissioners
9
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in 2014 (i.e. two-thirds of the member states).11 This will abolish the
link between the Commission and country, thus reducing subsidiarity even more as these Commissioners are instructed to look after
“the general interest of the Union.”12 The new treaty also makes the
European Council (the heads of state of the EU nations) an official
institution,13 thus subjecting the heads of state to sanction by the
Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ), the highest court of
the EU.14
Another important inclusion in the Treaty of Lisbon officially
recalls the primacy of EU law over the law of Member States in accordance with the case law of the ECJ.15 While already somewhat in
practice, this official recognition of the primacy of EU law will give
more clout to EU laws when pitted against national laws. Also, a new
office, “High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy,” i.e. European Foreign Affairs Minister, is created
by the new treaty.16 The High Representative will be the Vice-President of the Commission and President of the Council for Foreign
Affairs, and as such will represent the EU in international relations.
While the Treaty says the powers of this new position “do not affect
the responsibilities of Member States . . . for the formulation and
conduct of their foreign policy,” creation of such an influential
position will give the EU extended influence in foreign affairs
and security matters and open the door to increased usurpation

11
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of competency from Member States in the areas of foreign affairs
and security.17
Institutional reforms are needed, but they are needed to help the
EU return to a facilitating role based on national subsidiarity instead
of a creating a more central legislative body that can more readily
impose its will upon its member states in an undemocratic fashion
as these changes do.
B. Charter of Fundamental Rights
Another part of the Treaty of Lisbon not reflective of subsidiarity is a clause that contains a cross reference to the Charter on
Fundamental Rights. The clause gives the Charter the same legal
value as the Treaties and sets out the scope of its application.18 The
EU has long spoken of its commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms, and this Charter of Fundamental Rights seeks to
guarantee these rights to all citizens of the EU, rights that are said
to be based on common values and a resolution to share a peaceful
future.19 The motives for this Charter may be pure, but whether or
not the resulting legislation reflects the “inaliable rights” of human
beings, to borrow a phrase from the U.S. Declaration of Independence, is not the issue. The issue is that the EU should not be imposing its will upon its members on certain applications of the Charter
or be making decisions that Member States have the right to decide
for themselves. As can be seen in the following two examples, the
Charter of Fundamental Rights is one part of the Treaty of Lisbon
that reduces subsidiarity and shifts power from the member states
to the EU.
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1. ECJ interpretation of the Charter and primacy of EU law
The first example indicative of how the Charter is not reflective
of the subsidiarity principle is that the EU defines what the words
in the Charter mean, not the Member States. Title I of the Charter
is “Dignity,” which states, “Human dignity is inviolable. It must be
respected and protected.”20 The second Article (Article II-62) under this title deals with the right to life. It declares that “[e]veryone
has the right to life.”21 Pro-life activists, who argue against abortion
and destruction of the live embryo for embryonic stem cell research,
would seemingly be exultant at this declaration. Ireland, for example, is a nation that has traditionally been “pro-life” according to this
definition in that they haven’t legalized abortion. Yet the ECJ has defined who “everyone” is, and “everyone,” according to its definition,
does not include unborn children. As already established, the Treaty
of Lisbon officially recalls the primacy of EU law over the law of
Member States in accordance with the case law of the ECJ,22 and the
Charter is given the same legal value as the Treaties.23 Thus, if the
Charter of Fundamental Rights becomes binding upon the countries
in the EU, the ECJ’s definition of “everyone” will apply, and the
right of dignity and the right of life (i.e. the right to not be aborted)
is not extended to unborn children. Ireland (and more importantly
the people of Ireland) will not get to decide if abortion will be legal,
but instead the legal institution of the EU will decide. The issue is
not whether or not abortion should be legal; the issue is that, based
on the principle of subsidiarity, the European Union should not be
deciding for its Member States, like Ireland, on issues such as this.
2. Binding nature of the Charter
A second example is found in the reason the United Kingdom
fought for an opt-out from the binding nature of the Charter. One of
20
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the UK’s concerns with the original proposed Constitutional Treaty
was the legal status given to the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The
UK, along with the Netherlands and a few other countries, did not
want to have the Charter included as part of the new treaty. While
the Charter is not included in the text of the Treaty of Lisbon, it is,
as already mentioned, given the same legal value of the Treaties.24
Article II-88, under Title IV, Subsidiarity, declares the “[r]ight of collective bargaining and action.”25 This, in other words, gives the right
to strike. The UK has its own labor laws, as does each country, and
labor leaders in the United Kingdom are concerned with a Charter
guaranteeing the right to strike and the implications it might have for
their labor laws.
What those implications are does not matter; what does matter
is that, based on subsidiarity, the UK’s own democratic system of
government should be responsible for governing its own citizens.
As with the right to life, the issue is not whether the right to strike
should be guaranteed; it is whether or not the EU should be taking
upon itself more control of matters belonging to the member states.
That the UK has obtained an ‘opt-out’ from the enforceability of this
Title is irrelevant; the point remains that through the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the EU is assuming rights that “can be sufficiently
achieved by the Member States” without EU involvement.26
The EU, instead of devolving itself of decision making prerogatives to comply with the principle of subsidiarity, has, with
the legalization of the Charter and the establishment of primacy
of EU law, usurped control from its Member States that is inconsistent with subsidiarity.

IV. Conclusion
As a supranational institution, the European Union has a unique
role to build upon common principles and shared values of its member states without encroaching on the individuality of those member
24
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nations. The future of Europe depends on the shape this role takes.
In 1849, Victor Hugo dreamed that “[a] day will come . . . when all
[the] nations of [this] continent will, without losing [their] distinct
qualities or [their] glorious individualities, be blended together in
a superior unity, and constitute a European fraternity. A day will
come when the only battlefield will be the market opening to commerce and the mind opening to new ideas. A day will come when
bullets and bombs will be replaced by votes.”27 Hugo’s vision for a
better Europe was based on common values of peace, prosperity, and
democracy. These three values must continue to guide Europe as it
determines what its future will be. In order to restore the appropriate
balance of government, the EU must become more of a facilitator
and coordinator, as it was created to do, and less of a central legislator. The EU must continue to promote peace, as it was established to
engender in this historically war-prone region of the world. It must
also facilitate democracy by increasing the subsidiarity of its institutions and encouraging European nations to do the same. However,
as can be seen in institutional changes it will effect and the Charter
of Fundamental Rights it will make binding, the current Treaty of
Lisbon goes beyond its bounds of facilitating peace and prosperity
by reducing democracy and subsidiarity. The future of the European
Union rides on its ability to create a framework that will promote
peace and prosperity while protecting democracy and subsidiarity.
If that can be done, the future of Europe looks bright.
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